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Abstract
We evaluate the aggregate and distributional effects of climate
change mitigation policies using a multi-sector equilibrium model
with intersectoral input–output linkages and worker heterogeneity
calibrated to different countries. The introduction of carbon taxes
leads to changes in relative prices and inputs reallocation, including
labor. For the United States, reaching its original Paris Agreement
pledge would imply at most a 0.6% drop in output. This impact
is distributed asymmetrically across sectors and individuals. In the
US, workers with a comparative advantage in dirty energy sectors
who do not reallocate suffer a welfare loss 12 times higher than
workers in non-dirty sectors, but constitute less than 1% of the
labor force.
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1 Introduction
As greenhouse gas emissions reach alarming levels, there is increasing pres-
sure on countries to adopt more aggressive environmental policies. How-
ever, concerns regarding their economic and distributional effects hinder
the adoption of these policies, as reducing emissions means reallocating re-
sources away from high-carbon sectors towards low-carbon ones. A clear
example of such tension is the United States, where the Trump adminis-
tration dropped out of the Paris Agreement Accord and President Biden
just recently returned. This paper investigates the aggregate and distri-
butional effects of climate change mitigation policies, by focusing on the
reallocation of inputs, and labor in particular, across the different sectors
of the economy.
We develop a framework that integrates the workers’ skill distribution with
the economy’s sectoral composition. The theory builds on the Roy model of
occupational choice with endogenous human capital investment, in which
workers choose sectors based on relative wages and their comparative ad-
vantage (Roy, 1951; Hsieh et al., 2019). The model economy consists of
various sectors, including four energy-producing activities: oil, coal, natural
gas and green. A carbon tax is introduced to the “dirty” energy producers,
which in turn affects their prices.1 Given the intersectoral linkages in the
economy, these changes in relative prices create substitution possibilities
between all inputs of production, which lead to labor reallocation across
sectors. The overall economic impact depends on the magnitude of the tax
and on how the revenue is rebated to the economy. As economies differ in
their production structures and labor force characteristics, the impact of
carbon taxes is likely to vary across countries. We thus calibrate the model
parameters for the following six countries: Brazil, Canada, China, India,
Mexico and the United States.
We investigate the economic impact of introducing a 32.3% carbon tax,
which is the estimated tax needed for the United States to achieve its
original Paris Agreement pledge of a 26% reduction in emissions (Ramstein
1The “dirty energy sectors” hereafter refer to oil, coal and natural gas sectors. “Non-
dirty energy sector” refers to the green sector.
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et al., 2019). This carbon tax costs the United States at most a 0.6% drop
in output. We then implement the same tax policy for the remaining five
countries in order to capture the heterogeneity in responses among these
economies. We show that, in the worst case scenario, a 32.3% carbon tax
can cause a GDP loss ranging from 0.5% (for Brazil) to 2.1% (for China).
However, this drop in GDP can be partially offset by implementing tax
rebates.
The relatively small aggregate effects mask sizable heterogeneity at the
sectoral and individual levels, where there are non-trivial distributional ef-
fects. Our results show that dirty energy sectors exposed to the carbon
tax witness the largest drop in wages, and consequently the largest labor
outflow. By examining the skill distribution, we show that marginal (rela-
tively less-talented) workers in dirty energy production choose to reallocate
away from the taxed sectors. Workers with a strong comparative advantage
in the dirty energy production remain working in this sector and end up
bearing the cost of the drop in wages. In the US, the welfare loss for this
group is 12 times higher than for workers who work in non-dirty sectors.
Nevertheless, these workers constitute a small fraction of the labor force;
less than 0.6% in the US.
An important research agenda has concentrated on finding the optimal level
of carbon taxation by integrating the climate and the economy into a single
model, as proposed by Nordhaus (1994); Dietz and Stern (2015); Golosov
et al. (2014); Hassler et al. (2018); Tol (2018). Their findings point to the
effectiveness of carbon taxes in curbing greenhouse gas emissions and reduc-
ing emission-induced economic damage. However, this research abstracts
from the distributional impacts of climate change mitigation policies, which
is a key feature of our analysis.
There is a related literature investigating the distributional effects of car-
bon taxation. Grainger and Kolstad (2010), for instance, find that carbon
taxes tend to be regressive by focusing on the use-side incidence of such
taxes, since lower-income households devote a larger share of their expen-
ditures to energy consumption. However, other papers show that carbon
taxes can have progressive impacts once the source-side, i.e. the relative
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change in remuneration of factor inputs, is taken into account and tax rev-
enues are rebated (e.g., Dissou and Siddiqui (2014); Goulder et al. (2019);
Tavares (2020); Chateau et al. (2018); Bosetti and Maffezzoli (2013)). Our
paper investigates the aggregate and distributional effects of carbon taxes
by exploring how changes in factor prices induced by carbon taxes cas-
cade to the rest of the economy and lead to sectoral reallocation of inputs,
including labor.2 Unlike previous studies investigating the source-side im-
pacts of carbon taxes, individuals in our framework are heterogeneous in
their ability to work in different economic activities and choose their human
capital investment based on their comparative advantage and the human
capital return in such occupation.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
model and characterizes its equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the calibra-
tion strategy. Section 4 presents the aggregate results and Section 5 the
sectoral- and individual-level results of the counterfactual analyses. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy consists of individuals who live for two periods. As
in Hsieh et al. (2019), in the first period of life, workers draw an ability
vector that determines their productivity3 for working in each sector of the
economy. They make their occupational choice and invest in human capital.
In the second period, individuals work and consume. On the production
side, each sector produces a distinct intermediate good, including four types
of energy: oil, coal, natural gas and green. There is also a final good sector.
We describe the details of the model environment below.
2There are some papers studying the effects of climate policies on jobs by considering
the unemployment dimension (e.g., Aubert and Chiroleu-Assouline (2019); Castellanos
and Heutel (2019); Hafstead and Williams III (2018)). They are related to the literature
covering the labor market dimension of non-climate policies such as trade and innovation
policies. See, for instance, Adão et al. (2020); David et al. (2013); Lyon and Waugh
(2019).
3Ability, talent, comparative advantage, and productivity are used interchangeably.
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2.1 Households
There is a continuum of measure one of individuals, each working in one
of the J intermediate sectors. Individuals have two units of time: one unit
when they are “young”, which is allocated between leisure and schooling;
and one unit when they are “old”, when they supply their labor inelastically
to one of the intermediate goods sectors.
Each individual derives utility from consumption, c, and leisure, (1 − s),
according to the following utility function:4
U = cγ(1− s), γ > 0,
where s denotes time spent on schooling in the first period of life and γ
controls the relative weight of consumption in the individual’s utility.
Human capital for sector j depends on schooling time, s, and schooling
resources (like books or tuition fees), e, and is given by:
h(s, e) = sϕjeη.
The elasticity of human capital with respect to time is sector-specific, ϕj,
such that different sectors feature different returns to schooling.
The individual’s labor income is the product of the wage per efficiency
unit in sector j, wj, their idiosyncratic ability draw, zj, and their acquired
human capital for sector j, h(s, e). Individual income is split between
consumption, c, and expenditures on schooling resources, e. Given an
occupational choice, wage, and idiosyncratic talent, zj, the individual’s
utility maximization problem is given by:
Uj(wj, zj) = max
c,s,e
cγ(1− s) subject to c = wjzjh(s, e)− e. (1)
4To save on notation, individuals will not be indexed by a superscript.
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Note that changes in wages do not affect the individual choices of time
spent on schooling (∂s∗j/∂wj = 0), but do affect the amount of goods spent
on schooling resources (∂e∗j/∂wj > 0).













Each worker is endowed with a vector of idiosyncratic abilities {zj}Jj=1. We
assume that the individual’s abilities for the J sectors are drawn from a
multivariate Fréchet distribution, such that:








, λ > 1,
where the parameter λ measures the dispersion of individual productivity
across sectors. A higher value of λ corresponds to smaller dispersion. When
λ is small, workers’ abilities are more dispersed, and hence a larger change
in wages is needed to get workers to reallocate across sectors. And vice
versa.
2.1.2 Occupational Choice
Self-selection is driven by how heterogeneous abilities interact with the
endogenous components of an individual’s utility in (4). Workers supply
their labor to the sector which offers them the highest relative returns given
their vector of ability, i.e. highest utility maxj{Uj}.
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Knowing the decision rule behind workers’ occupational choice, we can
calculate the share of workers in each of the sectors of the economy.







where w̃j = wjsjϕj(1− sj)
1−η
β for j ∈ {1, ..., J}. (5)
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Each worker’s occupation choice is driven by relative returns w̃jzj instead
of absolute returns w̃j. Using the tractability afforded by the Fréchet distri-
bution, we can write the share of workers in each sector using (5). Having
calculated the labor supply for each sector, we can now compute the effi-
ciency units of labor supplied (i.e. effective labor supply) in each sector.
































Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Using equations (5) and (6), we can calculate average worker quality in a
sector by taking the ratio of efficiency units of labor supplied over the units
of labor supplied, Lsj/qj. Average quality is therefore inversely related to
the labor share in each sector, which captures a selection effect.
2.2 Production
Recall that there are J intermediate good sectors and one final good sector.
We will now describe each of these in turn.
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2.2.1 Intermediate Goods
Our production setup is similar to trade models such as Eaton and Kortum
(2002). There are J sectors, each producing a differentiated intermediate
good. Among these, there are four energy sectors: oil, coal, natural gas, and
green. The first three energy sectors are polluting, so we will refer to them
as the “dirty” energy sectors, and the fourth sector is the “clean” energy
sector. The technology to produce each intermediate good j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}












where Lj corresponds to effective labor input and βj is the labor share in
sector j. The variable xjk denotes the quantity of good k used in the pro-
duction of good j. The parameter νjk determines the relative importance
of good k in the production of sector j.5 The inclusion of intersectoral link-
ages allows for a more detailed analysis of the general equilibrium effects
of adding a carbon tax (Jones, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2012; King et al.,
2019).
The representative firm in the intermediate good sector j chooses labor Lj

















where Pj is the price of intermediate good j and wj is the wage rate paid in









5Golosov et al. (2014) estimated the elasticity of substitution between dirty and clean
energy sources to be 0.95 based on a metastudy of 47 studies of interfuel substitution












js = Pk, ∀xjk, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}.
2.2.2 Final Good
The technology for the final good, Yf , is given by a production function that







)σj , σj ∈ [0,1) and J∑
j=1
σj = 1.
The final good is the numéraire, such that its price Pf is normalized to
1. The optimization problem of the representative firm in the final good














and the optimal demand for each input satisfies:
Y Fj = σj
Yf
Pj
, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}.
2.3 Equilibrium
The stationary competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of indi-
vidual choices {c, s, e}, individual occupational choices, efficiency units of
labor input in each sector {Lj}Jj=1, intermediate goods {Yj}Jj=1, final output
Yf , wages {wj}Jj=1 and prices of intermediate goods {Pj}Jj=1, such that:
• Individuals maximize their utility, according to equation (1).
• Individuals supply their labor to the sector that provides them with
the highest income according to their abilities.
• Firms producing intermediate goods maximize profits, according to
equation (7).
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• The representative firm of the final good maximizes profits, according
to equation (8).
• All markets clear.
2.4 Carbon Taxation
A carbon tax affects the prices of energy inputs, particularly the more
polluting types. Therefore, the burden of the tax on the price of each energy
type should depend on the carbon content of that particular energy type.
Following Golosov et al. (2014) and Hassler et al. (2018), we differentiate
between four energy inputs (oil, coal, natural gas and green) according
to their carbon content (intensity of carbon emissions to the atmosphere).
Denote this content by gj, such that gj ∈ [0, 1]. Green energy types (such as
wind and solar) are not associated with any climate externality, so ggreen =
0. The carbon tax rate on each energy type is given by τj = τgj ∀j (note
that τgreen = 0 since ggreen = 0).
We introduce the carbon tax as a sales tax to each energy type j, such that
profits in energy type j, in the presence of such a tax, are given by:




In our simulations, we consider different ways to allocate revenues raised
with carbon taxes and adjust the equilibrium conditions accordingly. For
instance, in one counterfactual experiment, we consider the use of tax rev-
enues in dirty energy sectors to subsidize the green energy sector. In that
experiment, the green subsidy is designed such that the carbon tax is rev-
enue neutral (i.e.
∑J
j=1 τjPjYj = 0), which implies that τgreen < 0 .
3 Calibration
This section discusses how we discipline the model parameters in order
to investigate the aggregate and distributional effects of climate change
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mitigation policies. Since these effects are likely to vary across countries
due to country-specific characteristics (e.g. production structure and la-
bor force composition), the parameterization of the model is conducted
by disciplining the parameters with micro-level data for a sample of six
countries spanning a set of developing and advanced economies, namely:
Brazil, Canada, China, India, Mexico and United States. We have prior
information about some model parameters, such as the importance of each
input in the production of intermediate goods. But other parameters are
specific to the analysis and we do not have much information about their
magnitude. They will be internally estimated to match key moments of the
data. Table B1 in the Appendix lists all the model parameters and divides
them into these two groups.
External Calibration. To set values for J , βj, and νjk, we use data
from the World Input Output Database (WIOD), which contains national
input-output tables, as well as data on sectoral labor force participation
rates, labor compensation, and environmental accounts for the countries
in our sample. We use data on inter-sectoral sales to calculate νjk and set
βj = 1−
∑J
k=1 νjk. We aggregate the 35 sectors in the WIOD into 15 sectors
including one aggregate energy sector (see Table B2 in the Appendix). We
then split the aggregate energy sector into oil, coal, natural gas and green
energy production based on the energy input mix of each of the intermediate
sectors, according to the WIOD environmental accounts on energy use by
sector and energy type. We also use the WIOD environmental accounts
data on CO2 emissions by sector and energy type to calculate the effect
of taxes on emissions.6 More details on these parameters are presented in
Appendix B.
The sectoral carbon content, gj, is based on Golosov et al. (2014). The
numbers for oil and coal are goil = 0.846 and gcoal = 0.716. We replicate
their methodology and calculate ggas = 0.734 using estimates from Garg
et al. (2006).
We follow Hsieh et al. (2019) to calibrate η and γ. η is equal to the fraction
6Note that our framework does not model the feedback effects of emissions on the
economy. We compute the change in emissions in order to discipline the size of the
carbon tax.
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of output spent on education. From the World Development Indicators
(WDI), we collect the most recent data on public expenditure on education
(as a share of GDP) and normalize it by labor force participation rate to
calculate η for each country.7 To calibrate γ, we take average earnings in







1−η ). Note that average
earnings is proportional to (1−s)
−1
γ . We use micro-data from the Integrated
Public Use Micro-data Series (IPUMS) for each country in our sample,
except China.8 We then calculate the average years of schooling divided
by a pre-work time endowment of 25 years, s̄, and estimate the Mincerian
return to schooling across sectors, ξ, from a regression of log average wages
on average schooling across sectors for each country. With s̄ and ξ, we
calculate γ = 1
ξ(1−s̄) . The values for η and γ for each country are presented
in Tables B3 and B5 in the Appendix, respectively.
Internal Calibration. The remaining parameters σj, ϕj and λ are dis-
ciplined by solving the model and targeting certain data moments. In
particular, we calibrate the expenditure shares σj such that the sectoral
value added shares in the model match those in the data.
We follow the methodology in Hsieh et al. (2019) to estimate ϕj and λ. To
estimate ϕj, we use data from WIOD on the number of employees and labor
compensation to calculate the average wage in each sector.9 This yields the
relative sectoral wages, which determine the relative values for ϕj. To find
the absolute values of ϕj, we take the ratio of the average wages relative to
Agriculture. We calculate average schooling in agriculture sAgri and then
use equation (2) to solve for ϕAgri. With this, we pin down the remaining
ϕj by targeting the ratio of each sectoral wage relative to Agriculture.10
Data on the relative ratios of sectoral wages and the values for ϕ for each
country are presented in Table B6 in the Appendix.
7Two remarks: (i) we obtain expenditure on education for China from the Ministry
of Finance for the People’s Republic of China. (ii) we re-estimate η using data on
public and private expenditure on education from OECD for Brazil, Canada, Mexico
and United States. The results were similar and are available upon request.
8For China, we use micro-data from the Chinese Household Income Project, 2013.
9For China, data on number of employees is not available; so we use data on the
number of people engaged instead.
10Given the lack of information on the individual energy sectors, we target the ratio
of average wage in the aggregate energy sector relative to agriculture.
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To estimate λ, we use micro-data on individual wages to fit the distribution
of residuals from a cross-sectional regression of log income earned on age-
industry dummies in a given year for each country. We then match the
coefficient of variation of sectoral residual wages. The values of estimated
Fréchet parameters, alongside data and model’s estimates of the coefficient
of variation of wages for each country are presented in Table B7 in the
Appendix.
Model Fit. Following the calibration strategy above, we target sectoral
value added shares, ratios of relative wages, and the coefficient of variation
of wages. Although labor force participation rates are not targeted, the
model’s estimates of sectoral labor force participation shares are highly
correlated to their data counterparts (with an average correlation of 0.80
across countries); see Table B8 in the Appendix. To target labor force
participation shares exactly, we add wedges to the wages to capture pre-
existing distortions in the labor market in the benchmark model. We run
this robustness check for the case of Mexico, which has the worst fit for
untargeted labor force participation rates, and show that the main results
hold upon adding such wedges; see Appendix D.
4 The Aggregate Effects of Climate Change
Mitigation Policies
To investigate how the economy reacts to climate change mitigation poli-
cies, we introduce a carbon tax on the “dirty” energy sectors. We consider
five different counterfactual policies in which tax revenue is either: (i)
wastefully spent, i.e. not rebated back (“Wasteful Spending”); (ii) used to
subsidize green energy (“Green Subsidy”); (iii) used to subsidize all non-
dirty sectors in the economy (“Useful Spending”); (iv) used to subsidize
education expenditures for all non-dirty sectors (“Education Subsidy”); or
(v) rebated back to households uniformly as lump sum transfers (“House-
hold Transfers”).11
11In policies (ii)-(v), subsidies are designed such that the government budget is bal-
anced.
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Similar to King et al. (2019), our model does not feature an externality
since emissions do not affect production or consumption. Hence, given the
absence of externalities, the optimal carbon tax is zero in the benchmark
model. Our goal is not to investigate the optimal policy but to understand
the aggregate and distributional effects of imposing a carbon tax aimed
at reducing emissions. Therefore, our exercises are positive rather than
normative.
More specifically, our experiments increase the tax rate on oil, coal and
gas energy production sectors from τ = 0% to τ = 32.3%.12 This is the
tax rate needed for the United States to achieve its original Paris Agree-
ment pledge to reduce total emissions by 26% (Ramstein et al., 2019). We
also apply the 32.3% carbon tax to five different advanced and emerging
economies: Brazil, Canada, China, India and Mexico. Investigating coun-
tries with different levels of development and production structures allows
us to capture heterogeneous responses across countries to the same climate
change mitigation policy.
Table 1 displays the main aggregate results for this analysis. Panel A
reports the results on emissions, GDP, consumption and welfare of intro-
ducing a 32.3% carbon tax in the six countries analyzed. For each country,
these results are presented for the different types of tax rebates. Take
the United States, for instance. By construction, in the wasteful spend-
ing scenario, the tax leads to a 26% reduction in total emissions. Since
the dirty energy sectors pollute more than the other activities, the drop in
fossil emissions is larger (26.8%). As energy becomes more expensive, the
economy contracts and GDP falls by 0.6%. With the tax, reallocation of
resources and fall in output, aggregate welfare decreases.
If the government uses the carbon tax revenue to subsidize the green sector,
the fall in GDP is dampened to only 0.3%. With more economic activity,
emissions actually decline by less than with wasteful spending even with
subsidies to the clean sector. An alternative is to subsidize all non-dirty
12Adding a 32.3% value added tax translates into a tax τoil = 27.3% on oil sales,
τcoal = 23.1% on coal sales, and τgas = 23.7% on gas sales upon adjusting for the
carbon content of each energy input. This tax rate is equivalent to 37.7 US$ per ton of
CO2 in the United States.
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sectors (Useful Spending). Again, the fall in GDP is dampened relative to
the wasteful scenario, but emissions do not fall by as much.
When tax revenues are used to finance education subsidies, US GDP rises
by 0.4%. Individuals invest more in education with this policy, increas-
ing individual productivity and therefore aggregate output. Moreover, the
education subsidy partially insures individuals, and this can lead to an in-
crease in welfare. This type of insurance coupled with a hike in leisure
also explains why welfare increases substantially in the household transfer
scenario even though GDP declines. However, given the implausibility of
lump-sum transfers in the real world, we do not focus on household transfer
results for the remainder of the analysis.
Panel A of Table 1 also displays the results for the other five countries in our
sample. The main insights across the different types of tax rebates found for
the United States carry over to the other countries. The main differences
are on the magnitude of the effects. The reduction in total emissions ranges
from 24.0% in Canada to 32.1% in China. With regards to GDP, the
losses for the wasteful spending counterfactual range from 0.5% in Brazil
to 2.1% in China. The amplitude for the other scenarios is comparable.
Two key messages from our results stand out. First, the carbon tax has
heterogeneous aggregate effects amongst these six countries. This hinges
on the varying importance of the taxed sectors in each country’s total value
added, intermediate consumption and/or labor force composition. Second,
a 32.3% carbon tax seems to have relatively small aggregate output effects.
This happens because the dirty energy sectors constitute a small fraction
of the gross output in each economy. More detailed results are reported in
Tables C10 and C11 in the Appendix.
4.1 China versus the United States
Panel A in Table 1 reported the results for a 32.3% carbon tax, which is
needed for the United States to achieve its original Paris Agreement goal.
Such a policy yields different effects across countries. Instead of applying
the same climate policy for all countries, this subsection solves for the tax
14
Table 1: The Effects of Climate Change Mitigation Policy Under All
Recycling Schemes
Panel A: 32.3% Carbon Tax
Brazil Total Emissions Fossil Emissions GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -25.9 -27.5 -0.5 -1.4 -0.9
Green Subsidy -25.0 -26.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Useful Spending -25.5 -27.1 -0.4 -0.4 0.1
Education Subsidy -25.9 -27.5 0.4 -0.5 0.1
Household Transfers -25.9 -27.5 -1.1 -1.0 1.3
Canada Total Emissions Fossil Emissions GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -24.0 -26.6 -1.2 -3.9 -2.9
Green Subsidy -22.9 -25.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9
Useful Spending -22.8 -25.4 -1.1 -1.1 0.2
Education Subsidy -24.0 -26.6 1.2 -1.6 -0.3
Household Transfers -24.0 -26.6 -3.1 -2.9 2.5
China Total Emissions Fossil Emissions GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -32.1 -34.0 -2.1 -6.0 -4.7
Green Subsidy -25.9 -27.5 -1.2 -1.2 -1.9
Useful Spending -29.1 -31.0 -1.9 -1.9 -0.4
Education Subsidy -32.1 -34.0 0.9 -3.1 -1.7
Household Transfers -32.1 -34.0 -4.5 -4.3 2.8
India Total Emissions Fossil Emissions GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -28.2 -29.9 -1.0 -2.9 -2.1
Green Subsidy -25.4 -26.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7
Useful Spending -26.7 -28.3 -0.8 -0.8 0.0
Education Subsidy -28.2 -29.9 0.7 -1.2 -0.2
Household Transfers -28.2 -29.9 -2.7 -2.5 2.5
Mexico Total Emissions Fossil Emissions GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -25.3 -26.8 -1.1 -3.4 -2.2
Green Subsidy -24.6 -26.1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
Useful Spending -24.2 -25.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.4
Education Subsidy -25.3 -26.8 1.0 -1.4 0.0
Household Transfers -25.3 -26.8 -3.0 -2.8 2.7
United States Total Emissions Fossil Emissions GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -26.0 -26.8 -0.6 -1.7 -1.1
Green Subsidy -24.3 -25.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Useful Spending -25.3 -26.1 -0.5 -0.5 0.1
Education Subsidy -26.0 -26.8 0.4 -0.7 0.1
Household Transfers -26.0 -26.8 -1.9 -1.8 1.1
Panel B: 25.4% Carbon Tax
China Total Emissions Fossil Emissions GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -26.0 -27.5 -1.5 -4.7 -3.6
Green Subsidy -20.6 -21.8 -0.7 -0.7 -1.2
Useful Spending -23.4 -24.8 -1.3 -1.3 -0.1
Education Subsidy -26.0 -27.5 1.0 -2.2 -1.0
Household Transfers -26.0 -27.5 -3.5 -3.3 2.5
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rate needed for a country to achieve the same climate target as the United
States; i.e. a reduction in emissions of 26%. We take China as an example
and find that it requires a carbon tax of 25.4% to achieve such a reduction
in emissions. Panel B of Table 1 reports the results for this counterfactual.
A similar reduction in emissions in the United States and China generates
larger aggregate output effects in China. For the wasteful spending case,
the same reduction in emissions leads to a fall in GDP of 0.6% and 1.5%
in the United States and China, respectively. This is due to the fact that
China is more reliant on dirty energy than the United States. China has
a higher share of oil, coal and natural gas in its intermediate consumption
(5.4% vs. 1.8%), value added (4.4% vs. 3.0%) and labor force composition
(1.9% vs. 0.6%) compared with the United States. See Table C11 for more
details.
5 The Distributional Effects of Climate Change
Mitigation Policies
The previous section highlighted the relatively small aggregate losses caused
by the introduction of a carbon tax. This section investigates the sectoral-
and individual-level effects of this policy.
5.1 Sectoral-level Analysis
Introducing the carbon tax on oil, coal and natural gas energy sectors
causes them to downsize as they become more expensive relative to other
sectors. As a result, labor demand and wages in these sectors fall. Workers
re-optimize their occupational decisions and some switch sectors. Figure 1
shows the changes in equilibrium labor by sectors. Employment in the oil,
coal and natural gas sectors drops, while it increases in the non-dirty sectors
of the economy. With the subsidy to clean energy, inputs are reallocated
from the dirty energy sectors to the green sector to equalize marginal re-
turns. With an education subsidy, human capital rises because education
16
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Figure 1: Percentage Change in Effective Labor Upon Increasing Carbon
Tax from 0% (benchmark) to 32.3% Across All Scenarios.
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becomes relatively cheaper, reinforcing the increase in effective labor to the
sectors not directly affected by the carbon tax.
The occupational decision of workers is driven by their innate abilities
and the wage in each occupation. Marginal workers with relatively low
productivity in the dirty energy sectors reallocate to other sectors of the
economy. Workers with a high comparative advantage in the dirty energy
sectors remain in these sectors after the policy change. Therefore, due to
a selection effect, the average productivity of workers in the taxed sectors
rises (see Figure 2). In the green subsidy scenario, average productivity
drops significantly in the green sector due to the inflow of workers to this
sector, as depicted in Figure 1.
5.2 Individual-level Analysis
We now investigate the distributional effects more closely by focusing on
individual-level effects that arise after the introduction of a carbon tax. We
split workers into four categories: (i) those who remain in the non-dirty
energy sectors; (ii) those who reallocate from non-dirty energy sectors; (iii)
those who remain in dirty energy sectors; and (iv) those who reallocate
from dirty energy sectors. We then track how their welfare changes after
the implementation of the policy. Welfare is measured by the consumption
equivalent variation from adding the carbon tax relative to the baseline.
18
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Figure 2: Percentage Change in Average Productivity Upon Increasing
Carbon Tax from 0% (benchmark) to 32.3% Across All Scenarios.
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Table 2: Detailed Welfare Analysis by Country
Brazil Wasteful Spending Green Subsidy Useful Spending Education Subsidy
CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%)
Non-dirty sectors, stayers -0.9 99.6 0.4 99.7 0.1 99.7 0.1 99.6
Non-dirty sectors, switchers -0.9 0.1 2.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dirty sectors, stayers -14.6 0.2 -12.7 0.2 -13.7 0.2 -13.7 0.2
Dirty sectors, switchers -7.7 0.1 -6.5 0.1 -6.8 0.1 -6.8 0.1
Aggregate -0.9 100.0 -0.2 100.0 0.1 100.0 0.1 100.0
Canada Wasteful Spending Green Subsidy Useful Spending Education Subsidy
CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%)
Non-dirty sectors, stayers -2.6 96.9 0.6 96.4 0.5 96.9 0.0 96.9
Non-dirty sectors, switchers -2.5 0.2 9.1 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2
Dirty sectors, stayers -13.4 2.1 -11.6 2.1 -11.3 2.1 -11.2 2.1
Dirty sectors, switchers -7.8 0.7 -5.6 0.8 -5.2 0.8 -5.4 0.7
Aggregate -2.9 100.0 -0.9 100.0 0.2 100.0 -0.3 100.0
China Wasteful Spending Green Subsidy Useful Spending Education Subsidy
CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%)
Non-dirty sectors, stayers -4.7 98.2 -0.5 98.0 -0.6 98.4 -1.7 98.2
Non-dirty sectors, switchers -4.5 0.4 6.0 0.7 -0.4 0.3 -1.4 0.4
Dirty sectors, stayers -16.7 0.9 -13.0 1.0 -13.0 0.9 -14.1 0.9
Dirty sectors, switchers -10.4 0.4 -6.9 0.4 -6.4 0.4 -7.5 0.4
Aggregate -4.7 100.0 -1.9 100.0 -0.4 100.0 -1.7 100.0
India Wasteful Spending Green Subsidy Useful Spending Education Subsidy
CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%)
Non-dirty sectors, stayers -2.0 98.6 0.5 98.2 0.0 98.6 -0.2 98.6
Non-dirty sectors, switchers -1.9 0.2 5.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2
Dirty sectors, stayers -13.8 0.9 -11.9 0.9 -11.9 0.9 -12.2 0.9
Dirty sectors, switchers -7.6 0.4 -5.9 0.3 -5.6 0.4 -5.9 0.4
Aggregate -2.5 100.0 -0.7 100.0 0.0 100.0 -0.2 100.0
Mexico Wasteful Spending Green Subsidy Useful Spending Education Subsidy
CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%)
Non-dirty sectors, stayers -1.9 98.6 1.5 98.4 0.5 98.6 0.3 98.6
Non-dirty sectors, switchers -1.9 0.2 13.7 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.2
Dirty sectors, stayers -14.5 0.9 -13.1 0.9 -12.8 0.9 -12.6 0.9
Dirty sectors, switchers -8.1 0.3 -6.6 0.3 -5.9 0.3 -6.1 0.3
Aggregate -2.7 100.0 -0.8 100.0 0.4 100.0 0.0 100.0
United States Wasteful Spending Green Subsidy Useful Spending Education Subsidy
CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%) CE (%) LFP (%)
Non-dirty sectors, stayers -1.1 99.4 1.1 99.3 0.2 99.4 0.1 99.4
Non-dirty sectors, switchers -1.0 0.1 9.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dirty sectors, stayers -12.9 0.4 -11.5 0.4 -11.9 0.4 -11.9 0.4
Dirty sectors, switchers -6.8 0.1 -5.7 0.1 -5.7 0.1 -5.7 0.1
Aggregate -1.1 100.0 -0.3 100.0 0.1 100.0 0.1 100.0
Note: CE = consumption equivalents, LFP = labor force participation.
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Table 2 shows that workers who remain in the dirty sectors (oil, coal and
gas) experience the largest decline in welfare. Take the United States as an
example. In the wasteful spending scenario, the welfare of stayers in the
dirty sectors declines by 12.9%. This loss is approximately double the one
experienced by those who switch from the dirty sectors (6.8%) and almost
12 times the loss witnessed by non-dirty workers (stayers and switchers).
Similar numbers are found for the other counterfactuals and countries (see
Table 2). This decline in welfare is due to the reduction in labor demand
and wages in the taxed sectors. The measure of workers directly affected
by the introduction of the carbon tax, however, is relatively small—at most
1.9% of the labor force in our sample of countries (see Table C11). Due to
general equilibrium effects, labor reallocation also takes place in the non-
dirty sectors. Workers from the non-dirty sectors experience welfare gains
in most counterfactuals (other than the wasteful spending scenario). This
gain is especially large for those workers who switch sectors.
5.3 The Role of Worker Heterogeneity
In our benchmark model, workers have different abilities to work in each
sector. For instance, some are more productive in dirty energy sectors while
others have a comparative advantage in non-energy sectors. We now ex-
plore the role that this worker heterogeneity plays in our main results. In
our model, workers’ abilities are distributed according to a Frechét distri-
bution with parameter λ. Since higher lambdas mean a less dispersed dis-
tribution of abilities, we increase λ to make workers more homogeneous.13
With homogeneous workers, welfare losses are equalized across the four
worker groups by construction. All groups witness a welfare decline of
1.4% in the United States under wasteful spending as opposed to a spec-
trum of losses between 1% and 12.9% when heterogeneity is featured (see
Panel A in Table 3).
Panel B in Table 3 compares our benchmark aggregate results with this
version with homogeneous workers. For every tax rebate scenario, output,
consumption and welfare are lower with homogeneous workers. Therefore,
13We increase λ from 2.6 to 600 such that skills are essentially uniformly distributed.
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Table 3: Role of Worker Heterogeneity in the United States
Heterogeneous Workers Homogeneous Workers
Panel A - Distributional Effects
Wasteful Spending CE(%) LFP(%) Ratio* CE(%) LFP(%) Ratio*
Non-dirty sectors, stayers -1.1 99.4 1.0 -1.4 99.4 1.0
Non-dirty sectors, switchers -1.0 0.1 0.9 -1.4 0.1 1.0
Dirty sectors, stayers -12.9 0.4 12.2 -1.4 0.4 1.0
Dirty sectors, switchers -6.8 0.1 6.5 -1.4 0.1 1.0
Panel B - Aggregate Effects
GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv. GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -0.6 -1.7 -1.1 -0.9 -2.0 -1.4
Green Subsidy -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
Useful Spending -0.5 -0.5 0.1 -0.8 -0.8 -0.2
Education Subsidy 0.4 -0.7 0.1 0.1 -1.0 -0.3
Household Transfers -1.9 -1.8 1.1 -2.2 -2.1 1.0
*Ratio of welfare loss of each worker category relative to the non-dirty stayers.
modeling worker heterogeneity is key, both to understand the distributional
effects and to correctly quantify the aggregate effects of climate change
mitigation policies.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper quantifies the aggregate and distributional effects of climate
change mitigation policies within and across countries. Our results for the
United States show that, to achieve its original Paris Agreement Goal, a
carbon tax of 32.3% is needed and it causes a drop in GDP of at most
0.6%. Applying the same climate policy to other countries in our sample
(Brazil, Canada, China, India and Mexico) yields drops in output ranging
from 0.5% (Brazil) to 2.1% (China). The heterogeneity in the results is
due to varying degrees of importance of the taxed energy sectors in the
respective economies in terms of value added, intermediate consumption
and labor force shares. These adverse effects on GDP can be partially or
entirely offset through tax rebates.
Despite the small effects on output from imposing a carbon tax, there is
significant heterogeneity at the sectoral level. The dirty energy sectors ex-
posed to the carbon tax witness the largest drop in wages, and consequently
the largest labor outflow. However, by examining the skill distribution, we
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find that less-talented workers in dirty energy production reallocate away
from the taxed sectors into other sectors in the economy, while workers
with a comparative advantage in dirty energy production remain and end
up bearing most of the cost from the drop in wages. These workers, how-
ever, constitute a small fraction of total employment.
While our model featured considerable heterogeneity in terms of produc-
tion structure and worker skills, it abstracted from tackling some margins.
For instance, interesting insights can come from integrating our framework
with a richer description from the demand side. Individuals with differ-
ent income levels are likely to consume distinct baskets of goods. Another
possibility is to study the entire time path of adjustment in response to
climate policies. We leave these issues for future research.
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Online Appendix
A Appendix – Theory
A.1 Proposition 1 - Occupational Shares
The fraction of workers choosing to work in sector j is denoted by qj. For
simplicity, we present below the fraction of people who choose to work
in sector 1 and this calculation procedure can be replicated to all sectors
WLOG.
q1 = Pr(w̃1z1 > w̃jzj ∀ j ̸= 1)
= E
[











f(z1)F (β2z1)F (β3z1)..F (βjz1)..F (βJz1)dz1 where βj =
w̃1
w̃j
This is as if we are taking the derivative with respect to the first argument
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for j ∈ {1, ..., J}
qj therefore represents the equilibrium share of workers in sector j.
A.2 Proposition 2: Effective Labor
Following Hsieh et al. (2019), the total efficiency units in each occupa-
tion (including both talent and human capital accumulation) is number
A-2
of workers in every sector, given by qj, multiplied by average individual
productivity given by E[hjzj].
Recall that hj is given by:























































1−η |person works in sector j]
Next step is to calculate E[z
1
1−η
j |person works in sector j]. In order to do so,
we first calculate E[zxj |person works in sector j], where x is some positive
exponent.
As shown during the derivations of the occupational share, the new condi-
tional distribution of individual ability zj given that the worker sorts into
















. So the conditional distribution, G(z), is itself Fréchet dis-


















Using change of variables, y = 1
qj


























So for x = 1



























So average productivity is now:


















Note that Lsupplyj is sum of all individual productivities (i.e. total efficiency



















To investigate the partial derivative of Lj with respect to earnings w̃j, we
























B Details on Calibration
Table B1 lists all the model’s parameters and classifies them according to
the required calibration procedure.
Table B1: List of Parameters
Externally Calibrated Parameters Data Source
J number of sectors WIOD data
νjk input-output shares WIOD data
βLj labor shares WIOD data
goil = 84.6% carbon intensity of oil Golosov et al. (2014)
gcoal = 71.6% carbon intensity of coal Golosov et al. (2014)
gnatural gas = 73.4% carbon intensity of natural gas IPCC (2006)
ggreen = 0% carbon intensity of green Golosov et al. (2014)
γ consumption weight in the utility function Mincerian estimate using IPUMS data
η expenditure on education (% of GDP) World Development Indicators
Internally Calibrated Parameters Moment(s) Targeted
σj expenditure shares in final good Sectoral value added from WIOD data
ϕj returns of schooling in sector j Average relative wages using WIOD data
λ Fréchet dispersion parameter Coefficient of variation in earnings from IPUMS data
The calibration relies on two major data sources: World Input Output
Database (WIOD) and the Integrated Public Use Micro-data Series (IPUMS).
Both databases present the sectors according to the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC) of all economic activities developed by the
United Nations, however IPUMS conforms to a top level aggregation of 15
intermediate goods sectors, which we will refer to when aggregating the
data of the 35 sectors in the WIOD input-output tables. In order to do so,
we first collapse the 35 sectors in the WIOD tables to the top-level ISIC
rev 4 classification as presented in the first column of Table B2. Second, we
collapse the 21 sectors into the 15 sectors presented in IPUMS databases.
Additionally, since the focus of this paper is on taxing dirty energy produc-
ing sectors in the economy, we create an aggregate energy sector by merging
‘Mining and Quarrying’ and ‘Electricity’ sectors; the sectoral breakdown
is now represented in the second column of Table B2. Third, we split the
aggregate energy sector into four energy producing sectors: oil, coal, natu-
ral gas and green according to the WIOD environmental accounts on gross
energy use by sector and energy commodity. As such we end up with 18
intermediate goods sectors (J=18), which are presented in the third column
of Table B2.
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Table B2: Intermediate Goods Sectors
Sectors (J=21) Sectors (J=15) Sectors (J=18)
ISIC Rev4: Top-level Aggregation IPUMS Aggregation Authors’ Aggregation
A Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing A Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
B Mining and Quarrying C Manufacturing 2. Manufacturing
C Manufacturing E Water supply 3. Water supply
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply F Construction 4. Construction
E Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities G Wholesale and retail trade 5. Wholesale and retail trade
F Construction H,J Transport, storage and communications 6. Transport, storage and communications
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles I Accommodation and food service activities 7. Accommodation and food service activities
H Transportation and storage K Financial and insurance activities 8. Financial and insurance activities
I Accommodation and food service activities L,M,N Real estate, renting and business activities 9. Real estate, renting and business activities
J Information and communication O Public administration and defence 10. Public administration and defence
K Financial and insurance activities P Education 11. Education
L Real estate activities Q Health and social work 12. Health and social work
M Professional, scientific and technical activities R,S,U Arts and other service activities 13. Arts and other service activities
N Administrative and support service activities T Private household services 14. Private household services
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security B,D Total Energy 15. Oil Energy Production
P Education 16. Coal Energy Production
Q Human health and social work activities 17. Natural Gas Energy Production
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 18. Green Energy Production
S Other service activities
T Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods
- and services-producing activities of households for own use
U Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies
Now that the input-output table is aggregated into J = 18, we calculate
the input output matrix ν which represents intersectoral elasticise, such
that each entry νjk:
νjk =
Input of sector k into sector j
Sales of sector j
As already discussed, βLj is calculated by adhering to the constant-returns-
to-scale characteristic of our production function, such that βLj +
∑J
k=1 νjk =
1. These parameters are not presented in the Appendix for space purposes.
Table B3 presents the values for η, which represents the fraction of out-
put spent on education in every country. The public expenditure series is
obtained from World Development Indicators. We also refer to OECD for
private and public expenditure on education, but that is only available for
four countries in our sample.
Table B3: Expenditure on Education in Every Country
Public expenditure Labor Force η Public and private expenditure η
on education (%GDP) Participation on education (%GDP)
Brazil 6.24 63.88 0.10 5.69 0.09
Canada 5.27 65.07 0.08 5.95 0.09
China 3.52 67.99 0.05 - -
India 3.84 49.29 0.08 - -
Mexico 4.91 60.68 0.08 5.90 0.10
United States 4.96 62.05 0.08 6.09 0.10
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As for the internally calibrated estimates, Table B4 presents the final expen-
diture shares of each intermediate good alongside the value added shares
of each of the intermediate good sectors in the model and in the data.
Table B5 presents the estimated weight of consumption in utility γ, in ev-
ery country. Table B6 demonstrates the sector-specific elasticity of human
capital accumulation to schooling years in each country. Finally, Table B7
presents the Fréchet Parameter and variation coefficient of wages for each
country in our sample.
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Table B4: Intermediate Goods Sectors: Value-Added and Final Expenditure Shares
Sector Brazil Canada China India Mexico United States
VAj (%) σj VAj (%) σj VAj (%) σj VAj (%) σj VAj (%) σj VAj (%) σj
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 5.2% 0.038 1.6% 0.018 9.4% 0.036 14.8% 0.111 3.3% 0.016 1.2% 0.005
2. Manufacturing 14.6% 0.222 11.6% 0.087 30.1% 0.329 16.6% 0.293 18.8% 0.228 12.4% 0.131
3. Water supply 0.7% 0.004 0.3% 0.000 0.3% 0.002 0.2% 0.002 0.4% 0.001 0.3% 0.000
4. Construction 6.7% 0.107 7.7% 0.141 6.8% 0.261 7.2% 0.137 7.6% 0.125 3.8% 0.055
5. Wholesale and retail trade 12.4% 0.094 10.5% 0.106 9.7% 0.048 17.1% 0.087 16.8% 0.141 12.2% 0.131
6. Transport, storage and communications 8.0% 0.057 8.0% 0.060 7.2% 0.036 11.6% 0.110 7.9% 0.105 9.1% 0.079
7. Hotels and restaurants 2.4% 0.031 2.1% 0.027 1.9% 0.021 1.4% 0.023 2.2% 0.027 2.8% 0.039
8. Financial services and insurance 6.3% 0.044 5.5% 0.042 6.0% 0.013 5.5% 0.020 3.5% 0.029 7.0% 0.055
9. Public administration and defense 16.6% 0.089 19.5% 0.142 9.7% 0.061 7.7% 0.071 17.8% 0.105 23.1% 0.149
10. Real estate, renting and business activities 9.6% 0.125 9.0% 0.150 4.0% 0.067 6.7% 0.063 4.4% 0.064 13.1% 0.179
11. Education 5.5% 0.066 5.4% 0.063 3.3% 0.050 4.0% 0.040 4.3% 0.049 1.1% 0.016
12. Health and social work 4.2% 0.060 6.3% 0.063 1.8% 0.049 1.5% 0.021 2.3% 0.034 7.1% 0.116
13. Other services activities 1.8% 0.027 2.1% 0.025 2.3% 0.021 2.4% 0.021 1.6% 0.020 2.6% 0.031
14. Private households services 1.1% 0.011 0.0% 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.5% 0.005 0.1% 0.001
15. Oil energy production 1.7% 0.013 4.9% 0.025 1.2% 0.006 0.6% 0.000 4.3% 0.024 1.3% 0.002
16. Coal energy production 0.1% 0.000 0.5% 0.006 2.8% 0.000 0.9% 0.000 0.3% 0.004 0.7% 0.007
17. Natural gas energy production 0.3% 0.000 2.1% 0.018 0.3% 0.000 0.1% 0.000 2.0% 0.014 0.9% 0.000
18. Green energy production 2.9% 0.011 2.9% 0.028 3.2% 0.000 1.6% 0.000 2.0% 0.011 1.2% 0.002
Table B5: Consumption Weight in Utility Function for all Countries in the Sample









Table B6: Relative Sectoral Wages and Sector-Specific Elasticity of Human Capital Accumulation to Schooling Years



















1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1.0 0.59 1.0 1.82 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.61 1.0 0.55 1.0 2.81
2. Manufacturing 2.1 0.86 1.0 0.84 1.7 0.8 1.3 0.78 2.5 0.71 1.4 1.89
3. Water supply 1.9 2.49 1.0 2.98 10.1 58.4 4.2 8.19 2.7 5.32 1.3 4.98
4. Construction 1.0 0.52 1.2 1.24 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.00 2.6 1.29 1.5 2.79
5. Wholesale and retail trade 1.2 0.48 0.7 0.52 0.9 0.5 5.7 3.07 3.5 1.24 0.9 1.33
6. Transport, storage and communications 2.7 1.39 1.0 1.04 2.5 2.7 2.3 1.63 4.2 2.27 1.5 2.13
7. Hotels and restaurants 0.9 0.75 0.4 0.56 1.7 3.1 2.0 2.69 2.7 2.55 0.5 1.17
8. Financial services and insurance 6.2 3.07 1.1 1.33 3.3 4.1 4.4 3.40 9.3 7.76 2.2 3.04
9. Public administration and defense 1.5 0.53 0.9 0.63 3.1 3.0 2.5 1.97 4.1 1.46 1.3 1.44
10. Real estate, renting and business activities 4.5 2.05 1.2 1.22 1.7 2.2 5.1 3.67 4.7 3.37 1.3 1.76
11. Education 2.6 1.57 1.3 1.57 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.67 4.4 3.16 0.9 2.77
12. Health and social work 2.4 1.60 1.1 1.20 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.89 6.2 6.18 1.1 1.78
13. Other services activities 0.6 0.50 0.6 0.96 0.6 0.6 2.6 2.89 2.1 2.24 1.2 2.55
14. Private households services 0.5 0.62 0.0 0.09 0.0 1.8 0.0 3.10 6.2 12.24 0.8 5.09
15. Energy average (weighted by LFP) 6.6 4.57 1.9 2.54 3.1 5.3 3.3 3.66 6.5 5.78 2.4 5.23
Table B7: Fréchet Parameter and Variation Coefficient of Wages by Country
Country Data Data Estimate of Model Estimate of Fréchet Parameter λ
Sample Size Variation Coefficient Variation Coefficient
Brazil 8,241,143 6.37 6.37 2.32
Canada 463,677 1.08 1.08 2.72
China 24,915 0.91 0.91 2.72
India 85,855 0.90 0.90 2.80
Mexico 3,056,419 4.32 4.32 2.33
United States 1,488,316 1.41 1.41 2.60
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Table B8: Untargeted Labor Force Participation Moment by Country
Sector Brazil Canada China India Mexico United States
LFP LFP LFP LFP LFP LFP LFP LFP LFP LFP LFP
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Untargeted Untargeted Untargeted Untargeted Untargeted Untargeted
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 10.2 7.0 1.2 0.9 23.8 14.1 33.2 27.9 12.4 6.5 1.0 0.7
2. Manufacturing 11.9 15.7 11.5 13.1 19.6 40.5 14.4 27.5 16.0 32.5 8.7 11.7
3. Water supply 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1
4. Construction 9.6 9.7 7.4 6.4 8.4 6.8 16.7 9.9 16.4 8.7 4.3 2.1
5. Wholesale and retail trade 16.8 18.5 17.6 15.5 11.2 15.8 5.7 6.9 14.0 19.9 15.1 17.0
6. Transport, storage and communications 5.3 5.7 7.3 7.8 3.9 3.7 7.6 10.4 7.6 5.3 7.1 7.4
7. Hotels and restaurants 4.6 2.8 7.0 3.0 2.6 0.9 1.4 0.7 3.5 1.3 8.7 4.4
8. Financial services and insurance 1.3 1.6 4.5 4.4 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.9 1.5 0.4 4.0 3.4
9. Public administration and defense 9.3 23.8 10.8 26.1 3.2 4.5 4.2 5.5 2.1 18.4 14.6 29.7
10. Real estate, renting and business activities 5.9 4.3 8.4 7.6 5.4 2.5 4.6 2.0 9.2 1.8 16.7 13.4
11. Education 7.0 3.4 7.7 3.6 5.3 2.4 6.1 3.4 9.0 1.9 2.3 0.6
12. Health and social work 4.4 2.5 9.2 5.4 3.0 1.1 1.6 0.6 3.5 0.4 12.5 7.2
13. Other services activities 5.6 2.7 4.9 2.2 8.9 3.5 1.4 1.1 2.2 1.1 3.8 1.6
14. Private households services 7.1 1.5 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0
15. Oil energy production 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.2
16. Coal energy production 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
17. Natural gas energy production 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2
18. Green energy production 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2
Model Fit (Correlation between actual and model LFP series) 80.9% 78.6% 80.2% 89.1% 65.6% 85.3%
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Table B9: Data Sources by Country
Country Data Year Source
Brazil Input Output Table 2014 WIOD
Environmental Accounts to get energy input mix by sector 2009 WIOD
CO_2 Emissions 2009 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Force Participation 2014 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Compensation 2014 WIOD
Data on Income Earned 2010 IPUMS
Education Attainment by Sector 2010 IPUMS
Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP) 2015 WDI
Total Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 2019 WDI
Canada Input Output Table 2014 WIOD
Environmental Accounts to get energy input mix by sector 2009 WIOD
CO_2 Emissions 2009 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Force Participation 2014 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Compensation 2014 WIOD
Data on Income Earned 2011 IPUMS
Education Attainment by Sector 2011 IPUMS
Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP) 2011 WDI
Total Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 2019 WDI
China Input Output Table 2014 WIOD
Environmental Accounts to get energy input mix by sector 2009 WIOD
CO_2 Emissions 2009 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Force Participation 2014 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Compensation 2014 WIOD
Data on Income Earned 2013 CHIP
Education Attainment by Sector 2013 CHIP
Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP) 2019 MoF China
Total Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 2019 WDI
India Input Output Table 2014 WIOD
Environmental Accounts to get energy input mix by sector 2009 WIOD
CO_2 Emissions 2009 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Force Participation 2014 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Compensation 2014 WIOD
Data on Wage Earned 2004 IPUMS
Education Attainment by Sector 2004 IPUMS
Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP) 2013 WDI
Total Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 2019 WDI
Mexico Input Output Table 2014 WIOD
Environmental Accounts to get energy input mix by sector 2009 WIOD
CO_2 Emissions 2009 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Force Participation 2014 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Compensation 2014 WIOD
Data on Income Earned 2015 IPUMS
Education Attainment by Sector 2015 IPUMS
Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP) 2016 WDI
Total Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 2019 WDI
United States Input Output Table 2014 WIOD
Environmental Accounts to get energy input mix by sector 2009 WIOD
CO_2 Emissions 2009 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Force Participation 2014 WIOD
Sectoral Labor Compensation 2014 WIOD
Data on Income Earned 2015 IPUMS
Education Attainment by Sector 2015 IPUMS
Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP) 2014 WDI
Total Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 2019 WDI
A-11
C More Detailed Results
Table C10: Percentage Change in CO2 Emissions by Source, Country and Recycling Scheme
Wasteful Spending Scenario
%∆ Oil %∆ Coal %∆ Natural Gas %∆ Green %∆ Non-energy %∆ Total Fossil Fuel %∆ Total Unconditional Target Stated in Nationally Determined Contribution
Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions
Brazil -27.7% -26.6% -26.7% NaN -0.4% -27.5% -25.9% 37% below 2005 by 2025, 43% by 2030 (indicative)
Canada -27.9% -25.4% -25.1% NaN -1.2% -26.6% -24.0% 30% below 2005 levels by 2030 (unchanged from NDC)
China -29.5% -35.0% -28.8% NaN -2.6% -34.0% -32.1% 60-65% carbon intensity reduction by 2030
India -28.3% -30.7% -27.6% NaN -1.0% -29.9% -28.2% 33 to 35% carbon intensity reduction over 2005 levels by 2030
Mexico -27.8% -24.4% -25.0% NaN -1.0% -26.8% -25.3% 25% below BAU by 2030 (22% of GHG and a reduction of 51% of Black Carbon).
United States -27.7% -26.6% -25.3% NaN -0.7% -26.8% -26.0% 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025
Green Subsidy Scenario
%∆ Oil %∆ Coal %∆ Natural Gas %∆ Green %∆ Non-energy %∆ Total Fossil Fuel %∆ Total Unconditional Target Stated in Nationally Determined Contribution
Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions
Brazil -27.3% -22.8% -23.5% NaN 0.0% -26.5% -25.0% 37% below 2005 by 2025, 43% by 2030 (indicative)
Canada -27.3% -23.2% -23.7% NaN 0.0% -25.5% -22.9% 30% below 2005 levels by 2030 (unchanged from NDC)
China -28.1% -27.5% -25.6% NaN -1.0% -27.5% -25.9% 60-65% carbon intensity reduction by 2030
India -27.8% -26.7% -25.5% NaN -0.5% -26.9% -25.4% 33 to 35% carbon intensity reduction over 2005 levels by 2030
Mexico -27.4% -23.2% -23.8% NaN -0.1% -26.1% -24.6% 25% below BAU by 2030 (22% of GHG and a reduction of 51% of Black Carbon).
United States -27.3% -23.1% -23.7% NaN 0.0% -25.0% -24.3% 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025
Useful Spending Scenario
%∆ Oil %∆ Coal %∆ Natural Gas %∆ Green %∆ Non-energy %∆ Total Fossil Fuel %∆ Total Unconditional Target Stated in Nationally Determined Contribution
Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions
Brazil -27.3% -25.8% -26.0% NaN 0.2% -27.1% -25.5% 37% below 2005 by 2025, 43% by 2030 (indicative)
Canada -26.3% -24.9% -24.2% NaN 0.8% -25.4% -22.8% 30% below 2005 levels by 2030 (unchanged from NDC)
China -27.2% -31.9% -25.5% NaN 0.5% -31.0% -29.1% 60-65% carbon intensity reduction by 2030
India -26.8% -29.1% -25.9% NaN 0.1% -28.3% -26.7% 33 to 35% carbon intensity reduction over 2005 levels by 2030
Mexico -26.6% -24.2% -23.9% NaN 0.7% -25.7% -24.2% 25% below BAU by 2030 (22% of GHG and a reduction of 51% of Black Carbon).
United States -26.9% -26.3% -24.3% NaN 0.1% -26.1% -25.3% 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025
Education Subsidy Scenario
%∆ Oil %∆ Coal %∆ Natural Gas %∆ Green %∆ Non-energy %∆ Total Fossil Fuel %∆ Total Unconditional Target Stated in Nationally Determined Contribution
Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions
Brazil -27.7% -26.6% -26.7% NaN -0.4% -27.5% -25.9% 37% below 2005 by 2025, 43% by 2030 (indicative)
Canada -27.9% -25.4% -25.1% NaN -1.2% -26.6% -24.0% 30% below 2005 levels by 2030 (unchanged from NDC)
China -29.5% -35.0% -28.8% NaN -2.6% -34.0% -32.1% 60-65% carbon intensity reduction by 2030
India -28.3% -30.7% -27.6% NaN -1.0% -29.9% -28.2% 33 to 35% carbon intensity reduction over 2005 levels by 2030
Mexico -27.8% -24.4% -25.0% NaN -1.0% -26.8% -25.3% 25% below BAU by 2030 (22% of GHG and a reduction of 51% of Black Carbon).
United States -27.7% -26.6% -25.3% NaN -0.7% -26.8% -26.0% 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025
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Table C11: Sectoral Breakdown of Output, VA, Intermediate Consumption and Labor Force Participation by Country
Brazil Canada China India Mexico United States
Sales VA Int. LFP Sales VA Int. LFP Sales VA Int. LFP Sales VA Int. LFP Sales VA Int. LFP Sales VA Int. LFP
Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons.
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 4.5% 5.2% 3.7% 10.2% 2.3% 1.6% 3.1% 1.2% 5.3% 9.4% 3.2% 23.8% 10.4% 14.8% 5.5% 33.2% 3.0% 3.3% 2.7% 12.4% 1.6% 1.2% 2.0% 1.0%
2. Manufacturing 27.6% 14.6% 43.6% 11.9% 18.9% 11.6% 26.9% 11.5% 50.0% 30.1% 59.7% 19.6% 36.4% 16.6% 58.5% 14.4% 34.4% 18.8% 55.6% 16.0% 20.1% 12.4% 29.9% 8.7%
3. Water supply 0.6% 0.7% 0.4% 0.5% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3%
4. Construction 7.2% 6.7% 7.8% 9.6% 8.9% 7.7% 10.3% 7.4% 9.6% 6.8% 10.9% 8.4% 9.9% 7.2% 12.8% 16.7% 7.8% 7.6% 8.1% 16.4% 3.9% 3.8% 4.0% 4.3%
5. Wholesale and retail trade 10.3% 12.4% 7.6% 16.8% 10.3% 10.5% 10.1% 17.6% 5.3% 9.7% 3.1% 11.2% 10.6% 17.1% 3.3% 5.7% 12.5% 16.8% 6.7% 14.0% 10.5% 12.2% 8.4% 15.1%
6. Transport, storage and communications 8.4% 8.0% 8.8% 5.3% 9.1% 8.0% 10.3% 7.3% 4.8% 7.2% 3.6% 3.9% 10.4% 11.6% 9.0% 7.6% 8.3% 7.9% 8.9% 7.6% 9.5% 9.1% 9.9% 7.1%
7. Hotels and restaurants 2.3% 2.4% 2.3% 4.6% 2.2% 2.1% 2.3% 7.0% 1.7% 1.9% 1.6% 2.6% 2.2% 1.4% 3.1% 1.4% 1.9% 2.2% 1.4% 3.5% 2.9% 2.8% 3.0% 8.7%
8. Financial services and insurance 5.5% 6.3% 4.5% 1.3% 5.6% 5.5% 5.8% 4.5% 2.9% 6.0% 1.3% 2.0% 3.4% 5.5% 1.1% 1.5% 3.1% 3.5% 2.6% 1.5% 7.0% 7.0% 7.1% 4.0%
9. Public administration and defense 11.7% 16.6% 5.7% 9.3% 15.9% 19.5% 12.0% 10.8% 5.6% 9.7% 3.7% 3.2% 4.8% 7.7% 1.6% 4.2% 11.8% 17.8% 3.7% 2.1% 19.4% 23.1% 14.7% 14.6%
10. Real estate, renting and business activities 7.2% 9.6% 4.2% 5.9% 8.6% 9.0% 8.1% 8.4% 2.4% 4.0% 1.6% 5.4% 3.5% 6.7% 0.0% 4.6% 3.7% 4.4% 2.7% 9.2% 11.1% 13.1% 8.5% 16.7%
11. Education 3.9% 5.5% 1.8% 7.0% 3.5% 5.4% 1.4% 7.7% 1.9% 3.3% 1.2% 5.3% 2.3% 4.0% 0.5% 6.1% 2.8% 4.3% 0.8% 9.0% 1.0% 1.1% 0.9% 2.3%
12. Health and social work 3.5% 4.2% 2.6% 4.4% 4.6% 6.3% 2.9% 9.2% 1.7% 1.8% 1.7% 3.0% 1.2% 1.5% 0.9% 1.6% 2.0% 2.3% 1.5% 3.5% 6.7% 7.1% 6.3% 12.5%
13. Other services activities 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 5.6% 2.0% 2.1% 1.9% 4.9% 1.6% 2.3% 1.3% 8.9% 1.6% 2.4% 0.6% 1.4% 1.3% 1.6% 0.9% 2.2% 2.4% 2.6% 2.3% 3.8%
14. Private households services 0.6% 1.1% 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.0% 0.8% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
15. Oil energy production 1.5% 1.7% 1.3% 0.2% 3.7% 4.9% 2.3% 1.1% 1.0% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 3.2% 4.3% 1.8% 0.7% 1.0% 1.3% 0.6% 0.3%
16. Coal energy production 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 3.8% 2.8% 4.3% 1.4% 1.2% 0.9% 1.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.2%
17. Natural gas energy production 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% 1.5% 2.1% 0.9% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 1.7% 2.0% 1.3% 0.4% 0.8% 0.9% 0.5% 0.2%
18. Green energy production 2.9% 2.9% 3.0% 0.3% 2.1% 2.9% 1.3% 0.6% 2.0% 3.2% 1.4% 0.7% 1.2% 1.6% 0.7% 0.5% 1.5% 2.0% 0.9% 0.3% 1.0% 1.2% 0.7% 0.3%




In this subsection, we add wage-wedges to the case of Mexico, which had the
lowest correlation between the untargeted labor force participation shares
in the model and in the data. The model fit with the newly introduced
wedges is now presented in table Table D12.
Results in Table D13 prove robust to the introduction of wedges showing
that leaving the labor force participation shares untargeted in the model
has little to no effect on the aforementioned aggregate effects.
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Table D12: Model Fit Upon Introducing Wage-Wedges in Mexico
Relative Wages LFP
Data Model Data Model
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1.00 1.00 12.4% 14.4%
2. Manufacturing 2.49 2.49 16.0% 17.2%
3. Water supply 2.66 2.66 0.4% 0.3%
4. Construction 2.61 2.61 16.4% 18.2%
5. Wholesale and retail trade 3.54 3.54 14.0% 15.4%
6. Transport, storage and communications 4.24 4.24 7.6% 7.1%
7. Hotels and restaurants 2.73 2.73 3.5% 3.2%
8. Financial services and insurance 9.26 9.26 1.5% 1.0%
9. Public administration and defense 4.14 5.23 2.1% 2.2%
10. Real estate, renting and business activities 4.68 4.68 9.2% 6.9%
11. Education 4.38 4.38 9.0% 7.2%
12. Health and social work 6.23 6.23 3.5% 1.4%
13. Other services activities 2.11 2.11 2.2% 2.5%
14. Private households services 6.20 6.20 0.8% 0.1%
15. Oil energy production 6.46 6.50 0.7% 1.4%
16. Coal energy production 0.1% 0.1%
17. Natural gas energy production 0.4% 0.8%
18. Green energy production 0.3% 0.7%
Correlation 99.2% 98.3%
Table D13: Comparing Main Results for Mexico With and Without Wage
Wedges
Mexico - with wedges GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -1.1 -3.3 -2.4
Green Subsidy -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
Useful Spending -0.9 -0.9 0.5
Education Subsidy 1.0 -1.3 -0.3
Mexico - without wedges GDP Consumption Cons. Equiv.
Wasteful Spending -1.1 -3.4 -2.2
Green Subsidy -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
Useful Spending -1.0 -1.0 0.4
Education Subsidy 1.0 -1.4 0.0
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